


Refined Probabilistic Abstraction

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DES
SAARLANDES

December 8, 2010



- Bug in control software of power network
⇒ 50 million people without electricity


Model checking:

“does a computing **system** behave as **intended**?”

- mathematical model M of system
- specification φ
- automatic proof or refutation of:

$$M \models \varphi$$

- Example: $\varphi =$ **no arithmetic overflow**



e.g., arithmetic overflow



Probabilities are Important

- computer networks
 - performance: $P(\text{message loss}) = 2\%$
 - reliability: $P(\text{node failure}) = 3\%$
- randomized algorithms
 - network protocols
 - sorting algorithms
 - ...

Probabilistic Model checking

- models: Markov chains
- properties: PCTL


Probabilistic Model checking



- models: Markov chains
- properties: PCTL
- Zeroconf protocol
- IP for new member picked probabilistically
- bad: two members have the same IP!

Why Abstraction?


- Limitations of probabilistic model checking
 - based on state-space exploration
 - **state-space explosion** problem



$$M \models \varphi$$


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- **Abstraction** very successful




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
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
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- Limitations of probabilistic model checking
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- **Abstraction** very successful
 - **Refinement** fits the abstraction to the property



Contribution

Abstraction refinement for very large probabilistic models

- ... even infinite ones!
- implementation in PASS tool
- successful on various network protocols
 - Wireless LAN
 - IPV4
 - BRP
 - ...

Background

Probabilistic Programs

```
// parallel composition of modules
module sender
i : int; // variable definition
...
endmodule


module channelK
[aF] (k=0) -> 0.98 : (k'=1) // probabilistic
           + 0.02 : (k'=2); // guarded command
endmodule

init T=false & ... endinit // initial states
```

Semantics: Markov Decision Process (MDP)


states S

\cong assignments to program variables




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
states S	\cong	assignments to program variables
probabilistic transitions	\dots	probabilistic choice
non-deterministic choice	\dots	concurrency



- Markov chain \cong deterministic MDP

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
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
Properties: Probabilistic Reachability

- probabilities to reach states $F \subseteq S$
- valuations $[0, 1]^S \cong S \rightarrow [0, 1]$



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
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reachability probability: 1

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
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reachability probability: $\frac{1}{2}$

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
- reachability probability p_F^η
 - depends on adversary η

adversary $\eta : Paths \rightarrow A$

- resolves non-determinism
- \Rightarrow induces a Markov chain

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- reachability probability p_F^η
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- minimal/maximal


$$p_F^{\min} = \inf_{\eta} p_F^\eta$$
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
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least fixpoint of $Pre^{\min} : [0, 1]^S \rightarrow [0, 1]^S$

$$w \mapsto \lambda s. \begin{cases} 1 & ; s \in F \\ 0 & ; s \in F_0 \\ \min_{a \in A(s)} \sum_{(u,t) \in U \times S} R(s, u, t) \cdot w(t) & ; \text{ow.} \end{cases}$$

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
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Abstraction

Abstraction for Probabilistic Reachability

- Problem: many states S

reachability probability

1.0	0.5	1.0	1.0
○	○	○	○
0.2	0.1	1.0	1.0
○	○	○	○
0.3	0.7	0.4	0.1
○	○	○	○
0.0	0.8	0.3	0.2
○	○	○	○

in general, hard to compute

Abstraction for Probabilistic Reachability

- Problem: many states S



- ① merge states to blocks Q

reachability probability

B_1	1.0 ○	0.5 ○	1.0 ○	1.0 ○	B_2
	0.2 ○	0.1 ○	1.0 ○	1.0 ○	
B_3	0.3 ○	0.7 ○	0.4 ○	0.1 ○	
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


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- in example, **16** states but only **3** blocks $Q = \{B_1, B_2, B_3\}$.

reachability probability

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
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- ② compute abstract valuations $[0, 1]^Q$

reachability probability




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
reachability probability



lower-bound analysis

upper-bound analysis


Challenge of Analysis Design



- Open Question:

what does an optimal analysis look like?

Challenge of Analysis Design



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
what does an optimal analysis look like?

- Our solution:



- Recipe: **Abstract Interpretation** [Cousot77]

Challenge of Analysis Design



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what does an optimal analysis look like?

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- Recipe: **Abstract Interpretation** [Cousot77]
- Ingredients:
 - abstraction functions

Abstraction & concretization

① abstraction functions:

- mappings

$$[0, 1]^S \mapsto [0, 1]^Q$$

$$[0, 1]^S$$

$$[0, 1]^Q$$

w

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Abstraction & concretization

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
$$[0, 1]^S \mapsto [0, 1]^Q$$

- lower bound:

$$\alpha^l(w) = \lambda B. \inf_{s \in B} w(s)$$

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
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
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2 concretization function

(or meaning function)

- $[0, 1]^Q \mapsto [0, 1]^S$
- $\gamma(w^\#) = \lambda s. w^\#([s]).$




How do we get an Abstract Analysis?

- abstract analysis
 - function $f^\# : [0, 1]^Q \rightarrow [0, 1]^Q$
 \Rightarrow lower/upper bound = fixpoint of $f^\#$
- Best-transformer paradigm [Cousot 2002]




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

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
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Abstract Transformers = Stochastic Games

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
- Markov models
 - Markov chain = $\frac{1}{2}$ player
 - MDP = $1\frac{1}{2}$ player
 - stochastic game = $2\frac{1}{2}$ player
- minimum / maximum over all strategies *for both players*




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
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
Wrap-up




Wrap-up




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


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
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- diagram *defines* an abstract semantics (mathematics)



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
State of the Art before Thesis

- de Alfaro, Roy.
Magnifying-Lens Abstraction for Markov Decision Processes..
- Chatterjee, Henzinger, Jhala, Majumdar.
Counterexample Guided Planning.
- D'Argenio, Jeannet, Jensen, Larsen.
Reduction and Refinement Strategies for Probabilistic Analysis.
- ... build full semantics

CAV 2007

UAI 2005

PAPM-PROBMIV 2002




State of the Art before Thesis

- de Alfaro, Roy.
Magnifying-Lens Abstraction for Markov Decision Processes..
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Counterexample Guided Planning.
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Reduction and Refinement Strategies for Probabilistic Analysis.
- ... build full semantics
⇒ expensive or even impossible

CAV 2007

UAI 2005

PAPM-PROBMIV 2002




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
Premiere: 1st symbolic abstraction for probabilistic programs

- abstraction at the language level



Predicate Abstraction


- Predicates \cong expressions over program variables
 - e.g., $x > 0$, $x < y$



Predicate Abstraction

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define
 \Rightarrow partition




Predicate Abstraction

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
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
- reduce abstraction to **satisfiability** of logical formulas
- \Rightarrow implemented by **SMT solver**
- SMT = Satisfiability Modulo Theories

Example

- Consider program

```
module main
  s : [0..2]; // control flow
  x,y : int; // integer variables
  [a] s=0 -> 1.0:(s'=1) & (x'=y);
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


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


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


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


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


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


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


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
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
Wrap-up

- fully **automatic** and **symbolic** abstraction
 - for given **predicate** set




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


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
- fully **automatic** and **symbolic** abstraction
 - for given **predicate** set
- ... but where do predicates come from?




Reachability Properties




Abstraction Refinement




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
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
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
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
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
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


Property shown




Property shown

$$\mathcal{P}_B^{\eta^\#}(\rightsquigarrow \mathbf{e}) < p$$




Property refuted




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
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
?



Inconclusive: refinement due


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
CEGAR: Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement

- refinement technique in software model checking
 - SLAM project at Microsoft [Ball/Rajamani 2002,...]
 - Blast
 - ...



CEGAR: Counterexample-Guided Abstraction Refinement

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What **is** an abstract CE?


- pioneering work in probabilistic verification

Counterexamples

Safety: Error State Unreachable

Probabilistic Reachability


Transition System




Counterexamples

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CE is a Path



“error state is reachable”


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
Probabilistic Reachability

Transition System



resolve
nondet.
choice

CE is a Path




“**error state** is reachable”


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
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Probabilistic Reachability

Stochastic Game




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
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
Transition System



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
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
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Probabilistic Reachability

Stochastic Game



Markov Chain




“probability to reach error state = $\frac{1}{3}$ ”

Counterexamples


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
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
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Probabilistic Reachability


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
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• • •


Conventional counterexample analysis

- check if the abstract counterexample is realisable ...




Conventional counterexample analysis

- check if the abstract counterexample is realisable ...
 - if so, we've found a **bug**




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


- ... or spurious
 - abstraction too coarse, i.e., needs **refinement**




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


- Implementation with SMT solver:
 - convert path to formula
 - path realisable \iff formula satisfiable
 - generate splitting predicate, e.g., by interpolation

Analysis of Probabilistic CE

- Is there a matching real counterexample?
 - replay decisions of abstract counterexample


abstract
CE



Analysis of Probabilistic CE

- Is there a matching real counterexample?
 - replay decisions of abstract counterexample

abstract
CE



- Challenge: CE correspond to many paths
 - Markov chain: cyclic & has probabilistic branching
- Goal 1: Leverage conventional counterexample analysis
 - path analysis based on SMT and interpolation
- Goal 2: avoid exploring too many paths

Probabilistic CEGAR

- enumerate paths of CE Markov chain
- visit paths with highest probability first [Han&Katoen 2007]
 - path $\sigma_1^\#$
 - if spurious generate predicate (interpolation)

← abstract probability mass $\mathcal{P}_B^{\eta^\#}(\rightsquigarrow e)$ →

$\sigma_1^\#$

Probabilistic CEGAR

- enumerate paths of CE Markov chain
- visit paths with highest probability first [Han&Katoen 2007]
 - path $\sigma_1^\#$
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 - path $\sigma_2^\#$


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Probabilistic CEGAR

- enumerate paths of CE Markov chain
- visit paths with highest probability first [Han&Katoen 2007]
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
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
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- realisable probability mass $> p$?


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← $\mathcal{P}_B^{\eta^\#}(\text{realisable paths}) > p$ →


Computing realisable probability is harder than it seems

realisable probability $\neq \sum \{ \mathcal{P}(\sigma^\#) \mid \text{realizable path} \} = 1$




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Theorem (Realisable probability)


Realisable probability as optimisation problem:

$$\text{MaxSmt}(\text{exp}_1, \dots, \text{exp}_n) = \max \{ \sum_{i=1}^n [\text{exp}_i]_s \cdot p_i \mid s \in \llbracket I \wedge F(B) \rrbracket \}$$

where exp_i characterizes path σ_i


Probabilistic CEGAR

- analyse paths in Markov chain with decreasing probability
 - spurious paths give predicates
 - realizable paths can improve lower bound
 - MaxSMT



Probabilistic CEGAR

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- **Semi**-decision procedure for probabilistic CE analysis
 - always terminates returning either
 - ✗ CE realizable
 - ✓ CE spurious and predicate
 - ? don't know and predicate
 - **incomplete** to ensure termination
 - limit on number of spurious paths

Justification for Incompleteness: Undecidability

- A CE analysis problem consists of
 - probabilistic program M
 - threshold p
 - abstraction G of M
 - CE (B, η^\sharp) in G , i.e., $\mathcal{P}_B^{\eta^\sharp}(\rightsquigarrow \mathbf{e}) > p$
- **decide** if the CE is real
 - there is a corresponding concrete CE (s, η) with $\mathcal{P}_s^\eta(\rightsquigarrow \mathbf{e}) > p$

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Theorem (Undecidability of Counterexample Analysis)

Counterexample analysis for probabilistic programs is undecidable


Proof.

Halting problem for counter machines can be reduced to CE analysis \square

Backward Refinement (VMCAI 2010)

- Refinement if no threshold is available
- Target uncertainty from abstraction (leverage game strategies)

The PASS tool




Case Study: BRP

- Probability to reach:
 - “receiver does not receive any chunk and sender tried to send a chunk”
- Can be analyzed for an infinite parameter range with PASS
 - for any file size ≥ 16 , probability is $1.6E - 7$
- PASS provides proof for arbitrary file size
- BRP is just one case study:

Case study (parameters)		Property	Conventional			Abstraction					
			states	trans	time	states	trans	refs	preds	paths	time
WLAN (BOFF T)	5 315	k=3	5,195K	11,377K	93	34K	36K	9	120	604	72
	6 315	k=3	12,616K	28,137K	302	34K	42K	9	116	604	88
	6 315	k=6	12,616K	28,137K	2024	771K	113K	9	182	582	306
	6 9500	k=6	-	-	TO	771K	113K	9	182	582	311
CSMA/CD (BOFF)	3	p1	41K	52K	10	1K	2K	8	58	28	9
	4	p1	124K	161K	56	6K	9K	14	100	56	38
	3	p2	41K	52K	10	0.5K	0.9K	12	41	28	10
	4	p2	124K	161K	21	0.5K	1.5K	12	41	44	11
BRP (N MAX)	16 3	p1	2K	3K	5.4	2K	3K	9	46	41	9
	32 5	p1	5K	7K	12	5K	7K	9	64	111	21
	64 5	p1	10K	14K	26	10K	14K	8	95	585	91
	>16 3	p4	∞	-	-	0.5K	0.9K	7	26	17	3
	>16 4	p4	∞	-	-	0.6K	1K	7	27	17	4
>16 5	p4	∞	-	-	0.7K	1K	8	28	18	5	
SW		goodput	∞	-	-	5K	11K	3	40	7	87
		timeout	∞	-	-	27K	44K	3	49	6	89

Why abstraction works.


- absolute values do matter but only, e.g., differences between variables
- cannot contribute to optimum



Contributions

a novel analysis method for probabilistic programs:

- **symbolic abstraction** to tackle large state spaces
 - **Première**: predicate abstraction in probabilistic verification
 - prior work in qualitative software verification
 - **Challenge**



- **refinement** to achieve full automation
 - **Première**: Probabilistic CEGAR
 - prior work: CEGAR in qualitative software verification
 - **Challenge**
 - counterexamples are Markov chains
- implemented in **PASS** tool

Limitations

- Abstraction is not a panacea / silver bullet
 - can be less efficient for certain finite-state models
- Probabilistic CEGAR:
 - lower thresholds for minimal reachability?
- No support for state-dependent probabilities:

[] $m=1 \ \& \ x>0 \ \rightarrow \ \frac{1}{x} : (x' = x - 1) \ + \ \frac{x-1}{x} : (m' = 3) ;$

Avenues for Future Work

- Beyond probabilistic reachability for MDPs
 - rewards and expectations
 - Exponential distributions
 - Support for full PCTL
- Richer input language
 - Modest

Thesis Statement

Abstraction enables automatic verification of probabilistic programs with large and, for the first time, infinite state spaces.